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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2211 
___________ 
 
DENARD TRAPP,  
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
AMS SERVICING LLC;  
GDBT I TRUST 2011-1 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D. N.J. No. 3-14-cv-02746) 
District Judge:  Peter G. Sheridan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 11, 2015 
Before:  AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 22, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Denard C. Trapp, pro se, appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his action to 
quiet title and the denial of his motion for reconsideration.  We will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
 GDBT I Trust held a mortgage interest on Trapp’s property.  Alleging that Trapp 
failed to make his mortgage payment, GDBT I Trust filed a foreclosure action in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey on April 5, 2013.  On November 21, 2013, the New Jersey 
Superior Court granted GDBT I Trust’s motion for summary judgment and transferred 
the matter to the Foreclosure Unit of the Clerk’s Office of the Superior Court of New 
Jersey to proceed uncontested.   
 Six months later, on April 30, 2014, Trapp filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey requesting that the District Court declare the 
defendants’ mortgage invalid and quiet title in his favor.  The Defendants—GDBT I 
Trust and its servicing agent—moved to dismiss.  In response, Trapp filed an amended 
complaint that reiterated his claims, and he attached thereto a copy of a secondary 
mortgage, held by non-defendant Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., that he had paid in full.  
The Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss, arguing that, to the extent Trapp 
challenged Countrywide’s secondary mortgage, he failed to join an indispensable party 
(i.e. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.) and, moreover, that the District Court should 
abstain from producing a judgment contrary to the judgment of the Superior Court of 
New Jersey. 
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 After a hearing on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the District Court dismissed 
Trapp’s complaint ruling that Trapp’s claims, if any, relating to the mortgage held by 
GDBT I Trust were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Trapp filed a motion for 
reconsideration under Rule 59(e).  He also filed an “addendum” to his complaint, seeking 
to add claims for perjury and making false declarations before a court under 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1621 and 1623.  The District Court denied Trapp’s motion for reconsideration.  Trapp 
timely appealed the denial of his motion for reconsideration.     
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  A timely appeal from an order 
denying a Rule 59(e) motion brings up the underlying judgment for review.  See Quality 
Prefabrication, Inc. v. Daniel J. Keating Co., 675 F.2d 77, 78 (3d Cir. 1982).  We exercise 
plenary review over a district court’s decision to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  
Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).  We review the District 
Court’s denial of reconsideration for an abuse of discretion.  See Max’s Seafood Café ex 
rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999); Long v. Atlantic City 
Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 446 (3d Cir. 2012), 670 F.3d at 446 (stating that “our review 
of the order denying reconsideration is subject to a more deferential and circumscribed 
standard of review than would apply if we also were to have jurisdiction to consider the 
underlying dismissal order”).  “To demonstrate an abuse of discretion, [an appellant] 
must show that the District Court’s decision was arbitrary, fanciful or clearly 
unreasonable.”  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Moyer 
v. United Dominion Indus., Inc., 473 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2007)).   
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 We agree with the District Court that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Trapp’s 
requests to invalidate the mortgage and quiet title in his favor.  The Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine deprives federal district courts of jurisdiction “over suits that are essentially 
appeals from state-court judgments.”  Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild 
LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010).  The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when four 
requirements are met: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff 
‘complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were 
rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court 
to review and reject the state judgments.”  Id. at 166 (alterations in original) (quoting 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).  Trapp’s 
claims satisfy these four requirements.  GDBT I Trust sought to foreclose for non-
payment of the mortgage, and the New Jersey Superior Court granted summary judgment 
in favor of GDBT I Trust and transferred the matter to the Office of Foreclosure to 
proceed uncontested.  Thereafter, Trapp filed suit in the District Court, inviting it to 
invalidate the defendants’ mortgage and quiet title in his favor.  As the District Court 
concluded, it lacked jurisdiction to do so under Rooker-Feldman because the requested 
federal relief would necessarily imply that the Superior Court’s decision was erroneous. 
 Nor did the District Court err in denying Trapp’s motion for reconsideration.  “[A] 
proper Rule 59(e) motion . . . must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening 
change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct 
clear error of law or prevent manifest unjustice.”  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 
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669 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurace Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 
1218 (3d Cir. 1995)).  Trapp’s Rule 59(e) motion provided no such grounds, and the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.    
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
